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TECHNOLOGY, OCEAN MANAGEMENT, AND THE
LAW OF THE SEA: SOME CURRENT HISTORY
By EDwARD MILES*
In this article Mr. Miles discusses aspects of the recent history
of ocean law which reveal the impact of technological development

on the processes of developing international standards to govern
use and management of the oceans. More specifically he demonstrates how technology considerations have influenced the types of
jurisdictional claims over coastal waters which have been made by

various countries. The present state of ocean technology is briefly
outlined and discussed in terms of its implications for the future
development of ocean law, and the author notes that the law of
outer space will be shaped in a similar way by considerations of

technological development.
INTRODUCTION

T

HIS paper is intended primarily for the nonspecialist on the law
of the sea, and it will discuss some of the salient problems in
this branch of international law which have been considered since
the time of the League of Nations Codification Conference of 1930.
The major problems discussed concern the resolution of conflicting claims of national jurisdiction over the ocean spaces which
are contiguous to particular nation-states. The considerations which
motivate a particular nation to claim a 3 or a 6 or a 12-mile territorial sea, and the considerations which are relevant to the regulation
of ocean uses beyond the boundaries set by the traditional concepts
of "territorial sea" have changed drastically in recent years. The
most significant of these changes have been recent innovations in
marine technology. The problems which have been generated by
these changes have come to the forefront of international attention.
It is the purpose of this paper to provide both a summary of these
current problems in the law of the sea and a guide to the more
specialized literature in which these problems are discussed in more
detail.
In their monumental work on the law of the sea,' Professors
McDougal and Burke have pointed out that this phenomenon of
international ocean management really reflects three basic processes
vis-a-vis the human use of the oceans. At the highest level of general*Assistant Professor, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver;
B.A., M.A., Ph.D.
M. MCDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962).
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ity these are: (a) The process of interaction on and in the oceans
among all participants; (b) The process of claim arising out of
these activities; and (c) The process of authoritative decision to
resolve contending claims.2
These processes will be examined, paying particular attention
to the relationship between them. More specifically it will be seen
that the actual and possible uses of the oceans, as viewed from the
perspective of each country's economic and political situation, have
determinative effects on the processes of claim and authoritative
decision.
I.

THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENT

The extent to which a country is able to use the ocean as a
resource is dependent upon the state of that country's technological
and economic development. Interaction on or in the oceans among
nation-states would indeed be impossible without some minimum
degree of development in marine technology. It is therefore not
unexpected that rapid advances in marine technology would have
a substantial effect upon the entire process of developing international standards to govern the use of the oceans.
During the last six years, and particularly within the last five,
there has been considerable ferment on national, regional, and
global levels of questions concerning the exploration and exploitation of the oceans. This ferment is a function of several factors, the
major one of which appears to have been the continuing advance
in marine technology, which has had a major impact on the national
security of nation-states, as well as on the economic potential of
ocean exploitation. 8
Marine technology as it has existed up to the present time has
facilitated five kinds of human uses of the ocean. These are for
(a) transportation and communication, (b) food resources, (c) mineral resources, (d) national security, and (e) recreation. They have
involved essentially two-dimensional uses of the ocean, but advances
in technology have now placed us on the threshold of the third
dimension- depth. The inefficiency and dangers of operating at
or near the air-sea interface are being significantly reduced, if not
eliminated, and for the first time the exploitation of the deep ocean
2 ld. ch. 1.
3

See the comprehensive estimates published in COMMITTEE

ON OCEANOGRAPHY OF
THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES/NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, [hereinafter
cited as NAS/NRC] ECONOMIC BENEFITS FROM OCEANOGRAPHIC RESEARCH (Pub.

No. 1228, 1964).
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floor is a distinct possibility. In addition to this, we have begun
to pay increasing attention to the interaction between the atmosphere and the oceans with a view toward expanding our knowledge
of weather and climate and the possibilities of exercising some
4
control upon them.
This increasing technological sophistication has changed the
order of importance of possible conflict confronting participants
within the international maritime system. Through 1960, the major
problem was the limit of the territorial sea as it related to the problem
of jurisdiction over coastal fisheries. In 1969, the major problem
concerns the limits of the continental shelf and jurisdiction over the
ocean floor beyond the shelf.
During the early international conferences concerning national
dominion over adjacent seas, nations with limited technological
resources demanded large limits subject to their sovereign control
in order to prevent their coastal fisheries from being exploited by
distant nations with technologically superior fishing fleets. The
technologically advanced nations, on the other hand, wanted to
protect distant international waters, which they were capable of
exploiting, from encroachments by the coastal state.
Throughout the many conferences on the subject of national
dominion over adjacent seas during the early years, progress was
made toward establishing uniform international norms, but no satisfactory agreement was ever adopted. However, the recent developments in technology have opened up new areas for national
exploitation including the sea bottom adjacent to the coast and the
ocean depths beyond. This new capacity to reach the ocean bottom
has shifted the debate from the monopoly of coastal fishing to
entirely new problems unknown before this decade. As the capacity
to reach these new depths increases, the jurisdictional interests of
adjacent nations increase as well, and once again the conflict between
these expanding interests has brought the issue of ocean management
in its broadest implications to the forefront of international concern.
These issues became the focus of the United Nations General
Assembly debates on the Resources of the Sea in the fall of 1966,'
and the Maltese note verbale of August 18, 1967, proposing inter4 See NAS/NRC, INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE OCEANS (Pub.
No. 983, 1962); HOUSE COMM. ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SPACE AND THE
WEATHER, H.R. REP. No. 2561, 87th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1962); W. Sewell, Human
Dimensions of the Atmosphere, Feb. 1968 (Draft Report to the National Science
Foundation, Program on Applications Analysis, National Center for Atmospheric

Research, Boulder, Colorado).
5 U.N. Doc. A/OR/21/C.2/SR (1966), at 1062-65.
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national control of the ocean floor "beyond present limits of national
jurisdiction."'
The problems generated by the expansion of these national
jurisdictional interests may be pointed out by comparing one of the
earlier conferences on the law of the sea with some of the more
recent conferences.

II.

SALIENT PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF THE SEA SINCE

1930

At this time a review of three attempted codifications of the
law of the sea -The
Hague Codification Conference of 1930,
sponsored by the League of Nations, and the United Nations Geneva
Conferences of 1958 and 1960 - will reveal quite clearly the
processes of claim and authoritative decision, and will show how
these processes have been affected by expanding jurisdictional
interests. We should remember, however, that the three attempts at
codification took place in two different international organizations
and inevitably reflect the larger structures of these systems. For
instance, while it is true that norms which systematize and regulate
activities of competing participants on the oceans have historically
reflected the prevailing interests and capabilities of the major nationstates, particularly under the League of Nations, since 1955 minor
members of the international system, concomitant with their increased
role in the United Nations General Assembly, have been effective
in challenging existing norms and influencing the emerging law of
the sea in such a way as to be responsive to their own interests. 7
6 U.N. Doc. A/6695 (Aug. 18, 1967). For summaries of recent developments in marine
technology and the challenges they pose, see e.g., W. BURKE, OCEAN SCIENCES,
TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1966);
NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT,
MARINE SCIENCE AFFAIRS-A YEAR OF TRANSITION (1967); PRESIDENT'S SCIENCE
ADVISORY COMMITTEE, PANEL ON OCEANOGRAPHY, EFFECTIVE USE OF THE SEA

(1966); W. Chapman, The State of Ocean Use Management, Apr. 24, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the 2d Session of the FAO Committe on Fisheries,
Rome).

7 For reports and analyses of the Geneva Conferences, See Burke, Some Comments on
the 1958 Conventions, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAw [hereinafter
cited as ASIL] PROCEEDINGS, 1959, 197-206; Dean, The Law of the Sea Conference,
1958-1960, and Its Aftermath, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, 244-64 (L. Alexander ed.)
[hereinafter cited as ALEXANDER (1967)1; Dean, Achievements at the Law of the
Sea Conference, ASIL PROCEEDINGS, 1959, at 186-97; Friedheim, Factor Analysis as a
Tool in Studying the Law of the Sea, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 47-70; Herrington,

The Convention on Fisheries and Conservation of Living Resources, Accomplishments
of the 1958 Geneva Conference, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 26-35; MCDOUGAL &
BURKE, supra note 1; Neblett, The 1958 Conference on the Law of the Sea: What

Was Accomplished, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 36-46; Dean, The Second Geneva
Conference on the Law of the Sea, 54 AM. J. INT'L LAW 751-89 (1960); Dean, The
Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished, 52 AM. J. INT'L
LAw 607-28 (1958); Friedheim, The "Satisfied" and "Dissatisfied" States Negotiate
InternationalLaw, 18 WORLD POL. 20-41 (1965); Whiteman, Conference on the Law
of the Sea: Convention on the ContinentalShelf, 52 AM. J. INT'L LAw 629-59 (1958).
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In the three international conferences under consideration, the
issues of determining the limit of the territorial sea and the extent
of fishing rights in the contiguous zone became the focal points
around which highly disruptive conflict revolved, and in none of
them was it possible to arrive at agreement. In at least two of these
three conferences, these two issues were regarded as the crux of the
whole undertaking of the codification of the law of the sea. 8 This
is a vivid example of a situation in which no solution appeared to
be a better alternative than a solution which ignored the claims of
any of the competing groups, most of whom rigidly adhered to their
initial positions.
Claims made with regard to desired limits of the territorial sea
were almost identical under both the League and United Nations
conferences. Although some participants shifted their positions over
time, the limits suggested under the League were the same as those
proposed under the United Nations, with the exception of claims
to prescribe and apply authority over an area extending 200 miles
from the coastline made by certain Latin American states after 1945.
Also, under the League, the debates tended to be conducted in much
more doctrinal terms than under the United Nations, with the result
that the interests which lay behind these claims were often obscured.
A. The Hague Conference of 1930
At The Hague Conference of 1930, both the United Kingdom
and the United States, inter alia, firmly adhered to a 3-mile limit as
being most efficacious in preserving the historic freedom of the seas.9
This was, in fact, the majority position to which other nations submitted alternatives.
The most extreme claim which confronted adherents of the
3-mile limit was Spain's initial proposal that each country be allowed
unilaterally to fix the breadth of its own territorial sea.'0
8 Statement of the representative of Saudi Arabia at the 2nd Conference sponsored
by the U.N.: U.N., SECOND UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE
SEA, Official Records, Summary Records of Meetings of the Committee of the Whole,
March 17-April 26, 1960, A/CONF.19/8, at 37 (Hereinafter cited as U.N. 2ND
SEA CONFERENCE). See also, the statement of the Chairman of the 2nd Committee
on Territorial Waters at The Hague Codification Conference of 1930, LEAGUE,
PUBLICATIONS: LEGAL, V, 1930, 2nd Committee, Doc. C.351(b).M.145(b). V, at
119 (1930).
9U.N. 2ND SEA

10 Id. at 28.

CONFERENCE,

supra note 8, at 17-18, 20.
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TABLE 1

State Policies Towards the Breadth of the Territorial Sea Before
The Hague Codification Conference of 193011
3-mile limit
4-mile limit
Australia
Norway
Denmark
Sweden
Egypt
Estonia
France
Germany
India
Japan
Latvia
Netherlands
New Zealand
Poland
Romania
Union of
South Africa
United Kingdom
United States
(Total - 16)

(Total - 2)

6-mile limit
Finland
Italy

12-mile limit

(Total - 2)

(Total - 0)

-

18-mile limit
Portugal

(Total
- 1)

Unilateral
delimitation
Spain

(Total - 1)

In descending order of exclusiveness, Portugal claimed a 12-mile
limit, and in the explanation of her position we have a condensed
version of the entire conflict over the delimitation of the territorial
sea in both the League of Nations and the United Nations. Since
Portuguese fishing sites extended in the relatively shallow water
around her coasts for approximately 12 miles, said the Portuguese
delegate, and since the Portuguese population was considerably
dependent upon the fishing yield for a substantial part of its diet,
Portugal could not agree to any limit which would deprive her of
satisfying this essential interest.' 2 If, however, most states were
opposed to a 12-mile limit, Portugal was prepared to agree to a
6-mile limit and a contiguous zone of a further 6 miles in which
her comprehensive and continuing exclusive jurisdiction and control
over fishing rights would be acknowledged. 3
The primary interest with which all states were concerned
involved the competence to extend or prescribe authority over fishing
in certain waters adjacent to their coasts and beyond. Thus, by as
early as 1930, the terms of a debate which was to occur many times
were firmly established. The confrontation was one between those
states like Great Britain, the United States, and Japan which had
the capability and need for engaging in distant-water fishing and
those states possessing the need but not the capability for doing so.
In the latters' eyes, therefore, it was essential to gain exclusive control
over as wide an area of the sea adjacent to their coasts as was
'1 Complied from, LEAGUE, PUBLICATIONS: LEGAL, V, BASES OF DISCUSSIONS: TERRITORIAL WATERS, Doc. C.74, M.39, at 22-32 (1929).
12
Id. at 18.
a Id.
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possible; their attempts to do so were encroachments upon the
distant-water fishing interests of the larger nation-states.
After days of arguing, the original positions of states were
virtually unchanged and no agreement was in sight.' 4 The Hague
Conference was unable to agree upon an International Convention
regulating the limits of the territorial sea. As one Committee Chairman put it: "There is an atmosphere of resignation in the Committee.
We have to acknowledge to our regret that agreement is not possible
on the question of the breadth of territorial waters."' 5
TABLE 2

State Policies Towards the Breadth of the Territorial
6
Sea at the End of the Conference'
3-mile limit
Australia
Belgium
Brazil
Canada
China
Denmark
Egypt
Estonia
France
Germany
Greece
India
Irish Free State
Japan
Netherlands
Poland
Union of
South Africa
United Kingdom
United States

4-mile limit
Finland
Iceland
Norway
Sweden

(Total - 19)

(Total - 4)

6-mile limit
Chile
Colombia
Cuba
Italy
Persia
Romania
Spain
Turkey
Uruguay
Yugoslavia

12-mile limit
Portugal

(Total - 10)

(Total - 1)

18-mile limit

Unilateral
delimitation

-

(Total - 0)

(Total - 0)

B. First United Nations Conference of 1958
As indicated, there was very little difference in substance
between confrontations over delimitation of the territorial sea under
the League and confrontations under the United Nations. The international conferences sponsored by the United Nations did, however,
manage to reveal exactly those interests that lay behind various
positions. That these were much the same as those existing in 1930
was testified to by the delegate from Jordan in the First Committee
of the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.'
14

1d. at 123-26.

15

Id. at 160.
16Compiled from, LEAGUE, PUBLICATIONS:
Waters, Doc. C. 351(c).M.145(c) (1930).
7

2' U.N.

LEGAL,

V,

2nd Committee, Territorial

CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA, Geneva, Feb. 24-Apr. 27, 1958.
Summary Records of the Meetings of the First Committee (The Territorial Sea and
the Contiguous Zone), A/CONF. 13/39, at 18 (1958) [hereinafter cited as U.N.
SEA CONFERENCE).
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Summing up the conflict taking place in the First Committee
over the issue of the breadth of the territorial sea, it appeared to the
Jordanian delegate that the problem occurred as a result of divergent
views adopted by the great maritime powers, on the one hand, who
called for a decision on the basis of 3 miles, and the smaller nations,
on the other hand, who urged that a limit of 12 miles or more be
established. The bases of these divergent views, he thought, were
to be attributed to the fact that a strict interpretation of the freedom
of the seas would work to the advantage of the larger maritime
states while an extension of the area in which smaller states could
exercise comprehensive and continuing exclusive jurisdiction and
control would serve their interests - which were partially dictated
by their concern with defense. I" The concern with defense may have
been of paramount importance for the State of Jordan, given the
prolonged condition of hostility existing between the Arab States
of the Middle East and Israel. For the rest of those states opposing
the establishment of a 3-mile limit, however, the uppermost concern
remained with fishing rights.
The United Kingdom, supported by the Netherlands, Canada,
and France, continued to adhere to a 3-mile limit as the one which
had gained the widest historical acceptance and practical application.' 9 Being a little more specific, the United States claimed that
a 3-mile limit was the safest for shipping and was the most equitable
limit possible for all states.2 ° Furthermore, a 3-mile limit, if generally
recognized, would serve to secure fisheries, a source of food for all
the world, from further encroachment of the coastal state.2 I This
claim was strongly supported by Japan, which depended on the sea
for 90 percent of her animal protein.2
Of those states who lobbied for a 3-mile limit, Canada was
among the first to offer a compromise - the establishment of a
3-mile territorial limit, with a 12-mile contiguous zone for fishing.2"
Now forced into specificity, the United Kingdom replied that its
own economic interests could not admit to such an extension. 21
The most extreme claims were those proposed by Peru, Chile,
Costa Rica, and El Salvador, all of whom demanded general recog18Id.
9

1 1d. at 8, 11, 19.

20Id. at 25-26.
21

Id.

22

Id. at 24-25.

2

Id. at 90. The phrase "territorial limits'" meant those waters subject to a comprehensive and continuing exclusive jurisdiction and control - i.e., subject to the absolute sovereignty of the adjacent nation. The phrase "contiguous zone" meant those
waters beyond the territorial limits over which the adjacent nation would be awarded
specified competences by international agreement to occasionally exercise jurisdiction
and control with regard to certain particular interests within the zone.
Id. at 104.

2

4
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nition of the extension of their territorial sea to 200 miles in order
"to protect the living resources of the sea from excessive exploitation
by foreign fishing fleets.""1 Both Burma and Indonesia called for
the establishment of varying breadths based on the "economic,
geographical, biological, technological, political, and defense needs
of the state concerned." 2 The foregoing positions, and others, are
summarized in Table 3.
In the light of these diverse positions, each supported so rigidly
by its own faction, it is not surprising that effective compromise
proved elusive. In addition, voting tended to be in blocs composed
on the basis of interests and/or geographical location, and all proposals which were offered failed to command a consensus, no matter
how many conciliations were made.
C. Second United Nations Conference of 1960
The Second United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
in 1960 was essentially a continuation of the first, and the attending
nations continued to build upon proposals submitted during the
previous conference in an attempt to reach the two-thirds majority
required for agreement. In another attempt at the reconciliation of
competing interests, the United States reintroduced a proposal in
which the maximum limit of the territorial sea was to be 6 miles
with a contiguous zone for fishing extending for another 6 miles.2 8
In addition, foreign fishermen who had been accustomed to fish in
this contiguous 6-mile zone before January 1, 1958 (the base period),
would be allowed to fish for the same yield of the same groups of
species.29 The United States delegate also explicity recognized that
this proposal did not provide for those special situations in which
the coastal state was particularly dependent upon fishing but where
it did not possess the technical capability to fish beyond coastal
waters. On this point, however, the United States was prepared to
extend sympathetic and careful consideration."0
The United Kingdom, with great reluctance, supported this
proposal which would involve a "heavy sacrifice" for her fishing
interests.8 1 But the Yugoslav delegate severely attacked the provision securing the rights of foreign fishermen as a poorly conceived
effort to uphold acquired rights which were nothing but "vestiges
2Id.

at 33 ; see also 6, 48.

U.N. SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 17, at 4, 14.
27 U.N. 2ND SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 158-63.
2 U.N. 2ND SEA CONFERENCE, supra note 8, at 45-46.
2

28

id.

30Id.
31
id. at 55.
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of colonialism.""2 Canada was again opposed to this provision but
this time was prepared to compromise if the United States placed
a 5-year limit on the preceding base period and a 10-year limit on
the exercise of these benefits by foreign fishermen from October 31,
1960. This having been done, the proposal was jointly sponsored
by the United States and Canada. 3 Because of this amendment,
though, the proposal was unpalatable to the United Kingdom, to
34
whom the time periods were too short and the costs too great.
But she still voted for it in Plenary Session, at which time the vote
was 54 in favor, 28 opposed, with five abstentions. 5 It was not
adopted, however, as it was one vote short of the required twothirds majority. Consequently, no norm regulating the breadth of
the territorial sea was included in the results of either convention.
Only a few of the significant positions, proposals, and votes
on this issue are described above. However, Robert Friedheim has
factor analyzed all 78 votes - 67 substantive and 11 procedural taken during the 1958 and 1960 Geneva Conferences in order to
determine the underlying issues of conflict in voting behavior.3 6
His results are compatible with the statements made heretofore.3 7
III. OVERVIEW OF OUR CURRENT SITUATION
Given this background, what trends are now evident on issues

concerning the territorial sea, contiguous zone, and jurisdiction over
fisheries?

At the end of the long discussions on the problem of the territorial sea in the International Law Commission, there was neither
32

1 d. at 70.
d. at 121.
341d. at 126-27.
35Id. at 30.
36 Friedheim, Factor Analysis as a Tool in Studying the Law of the Sea, in ALEXANDER
(1967), at 47-70.
37 Id. at 57. Friedheim claims that combining proposals on the breadth of the territorial
sea with proposals on a contiguous zone probably explained the failure to reach any
acceptable compromise. As mentioned earlier, supra note 23, the contiguous zone was
an area beyond the territorial limits over which the adjacent nation would be awarded
specified competences to exercise a limited jurisdiction with regard to particular
interests. Conflict regarding the contiguous zone revolved around what specified
competences were to be awarded the coastal state, the legal significance of such competence, and the manner in which its enforcement was to be accomplished. See e.g.,
LEAGUE, PUBLICATIONS: LEGAL, V, 2d Committee, at 31, (1930).
For example, although it was generally agreed that a state could exercise occasional jurisdiction in the contiguous zone in regard to fiscal, sanitary, and customs
interests (A/CN.4/Ser. A/1956/Add. 1, 2 ILC YEARBOOK, 1956, at 264 (1956))
a dispute arose at the first United Nations Conference as to whether or not a coastal
state should be allowed to exercise jurisdiction and control within the contiguous
zone on the basis of security interests. U.N. SEA CONFERENCE, 1st Committee, at
107, 181. See also, criticisms of the International Law Commission's recommendations
and the decisions of the 2nd U.N. Conference in McDoUGAL & BURKE, supra note 1,
at 76, 604-07.
33
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a single point of view nor a concrete proposal which had gained
general acceptance. In the face of hopeless deadlock, therefore, by
the significant vote of 7 to 6, the ILC passed the problem on to the
future international conference in the following way:
1. The Commission recognizes that international practice is not

uniform as regards the traditional limitation of the territorial
sea to three miles.
2. The Commission considers that international law does not justify
an extension of the territorial sea beyond twelve miles.
3. The Commission, without taking any decisions as to the breadth
of the territorial sea within that limit, considers that international law does not require States to recognize a breadth
beyond three miles.3 8
Somewhat ironically, in spite of (or perhaps as a result of),
the conflict generated in 1958 and 1960, this is about where we
stand. Even at the end of the 1930 Conference the traditional 3-mile
limit still represented the majority position, although the 6-mile
limit had increased its supporters from two to 10. By 1960, however, the 3-mile position had declined from a majority to a plurality,
the 10-mile position had remained steady but was superseded by
the 12-mile position which now had 13 adherents. In fact, a majority
of states (33) supported positions which called for limits greater
than 3 miles. If they did nothing else, therefore, the 1958 and 1960
Conferences definitely undermined the supremacy of the traditional
restrictive 3-mile limit and the lesser developed states did much to
achieve this.
As of 1967, the situation, based on data provided by Professor
Lewis Alexander, looks like this:
TABLE 4

Frequency Distribution of Current
Limits to the Territorial Sea"
Limit
3 miles
4
5
6

"
"
"

12 Km.
9 miles
10 "

Number of
Countries
32

Limit
12 miles

Number of
Countries
26

3
1
16

50 Km.
130 miles
200 "

1
1
1

1
1
2

None specified
No information
Landlocked countries

7
15
28

Although the distribution is considerably affected by the comprehensiveness of the data, the major clusters are still around the 3,
6, and 12-mile limits. However, at least 50 percent of all countries
with a seacoast now have limits beyond 3 miles. The figure is higher
than that if we realize that states like Costa Rica, Iceland, Peru,
38
39

A/CN.4/Ser. A/1955 Add 1, 2 ILC YEARBOOK, 1955, at 35.
Alexander, Offrhore Claims of the World, ALEXAN, ER (1967),

Table 3, at 72-75.
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and South Korea who report no specified limit certainly are not
stout defenders of the traditional norm. On the other hand, there
are only three countries who claim limits beyond 12 miles, and so
we are back to the ILC's conclusion.
While the evidence suggests that exclusive claims on the territorial sea may have stabilized around the 12-mile limit as maximum,
it is not entirely clear that claims concerning fishery jurisdiction
have also stabilized, even though zones up to 12 miles now represent
the majority (55 out of 86) position. 0
There is another irony about all this - fish do not breed and
live according to rigidly defined constructs like contiguous zones,
nor is a territorial sea of 12 miles any more effective for security
reasons than one of 3 miles.4 1 As McDougal and Burke so aptly
point out, the spatial variable per se is not crucial and, indeed, is
often misleading. Rather, "what is important for policy is not mere
distance but the concentration of activities and interests being
42
located."
If we were to contrast the distinctive features of the 1958 and
1960 Geneva Conferences with those of The Hague Conference of
1930, the major differences would have to be phrased in terms of
the primacy of the East-West confrontation in the post World War II
era, the rate of technological advance and the expectations that are
generated as a result, and the role played by the smaller, lesser
developed participants in shaping the outcomes of the last two
conferences. One of the other striking differences to be observed
would be in the whole issue of the continental shelf which did not
even exist as far as The Hague Conference was concerned.
It was not until 1942 that the first treaty demarcating relative
jurisdictions over the shelf in the Gulf of Paria was signed between
Britain and Venezuela, and it was not until 1945 that the United
States issued its proclamation claiming jurisdiction over the shelf
surrounding the United States.48 This was followed by an Argentinean claim which included the superjacent waters, with the United
States denying the validity of the latter ingredient.
The problem of defining the limits of the shelf is difficult
because the concept refers to the subsoil extending from the coast
of a state out under the sea and the geologic diversity which exists
makes any limit defined in terms of depth an artificial one. This is
40Neblett, The 1968 Conference on the Law of the Sea: What Was Accomplished,
ALEXANDER (1967), Table 1, at 42.
41 McDougal, International Law and the Law of the Sea, ALEXANDER (1967), at 20.
4

McDouGL & BURKE, supra note 1, at 9, n. 25.
43 For the relevant documents, see H. BRIGGS, THE LAw OF NATIONS 377-85 (2d ed.
1952). For a more conprehensive history see Moutan, The Continental Shelf, 85
RECUEIL DES COURS 347-463 (1954).
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so even though UNESCO claimed in 1957 that the continental shelf
44
had a remarkably uniform marginal depth of 100 to 150 meters.
Prior to 1945, the shelf was important primarily for coastal
fisheries, both pelagic and sedentary, because the water is sufficiently
shallow to allow considerable photosynthetic activity which leads to
the creation of rather large fisheries. 4" In addition, there was some
coal mining, but it was the coming of off-shore oil drilling operations
that led to the new significance attached to this area. As a result,
the continental shelf became a major issue about which most
controversy turned in the ILC's preparatory work on the law of the
sea.
As the Commission stated in its commentary, the debate over
definitions of the continental shelf was a long (and at times confusing) one. 46 Several times the Commission wavered between
adopting the criterion of exploitability to define the limits of the
shelf and adopting a precise limit based on the depth of the
superjacent ocean, i.e., up to 200 meters. In the end, the Commission
included both criteria.47
During the discussion on the legal status of the shelf, Mr. Ivan
Kerno, representative of the Secretary-General to the ILC, stated
that whatever the Commission decided about the continental shelf,
explicit mention should be made of the status of its superjacent
waters. 48
He suggested that although it was necessary for the ILC to
make specific the depth and distance up to which rights of jurisdiction and control could be exercised by the coastal state, these
limits should be supplemented by a provision designed to maintain
the flexibility of the norm vis-a-vis continued advances in techniques
of exploitation. In other words, both a fixed limit and the exploitability criterion should be employed. There appeared, at no time,
UNESCO, SCIENTIFIC CONSIDERATIONS RELATING TO THE CONTINENTAL SHELF, in
U.N. SEA CONFERENCE: PREPARATORY DOCUMENTS, Doc. A/CONF. 13/2/Add. 1, at
39-46 (1957). For a more recent analysis which differs considerably from UNESCO's,
see Emery, Geological Aspects of Sea-Floor Sovereignty, in ALEXANDER (1967), at
139-59.
4 Chapman, Fishery Resources in Offshore Waters, in ALEXANDER (1967), at 87-105.
See also FAO, Examination of Living Resources Associated with the Sea Bed of the
Continental Shelf with Regard to the Nature and Degree of their Physical and Biological Association with Such Sea Bed in U.N. SEA CONFERENCE: PREPARATORY
DOCUMENTS, Doc. A/CONF. 13/13, at 187-97 (1957).
46 2 ILC YEARBOOKS, 1956, at 296-97.
47 Article 67 reads:
For the purposes of these articles, the term "continental shelf" is used
as referring to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the
coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres
(approximately 100 fathoms) or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of
the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of
the said areas.
A/CNA/Ser. A/1956/Add. 1, at 296.
4U.N. Doec's A/CN.4/Ser. A/1950, 1 ILC YEARBOOK, 1950, at 228.
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to have been any consideration of the probable incompatibility of
these two criteria in practice, especially in terms of the conflict
which might be generated between those states which could sponsor
and employ advances in techniques of exploitation as opposed to
those which could not. Prior to the 1958 Conference, UNESCO had
prepared a working paper on this question which specifically pointed
out the incompatibility of a combined bathymetric/exploitability
limit, but there is no indication that this warning was heeded in the
debates.
The solution which was finally adopted during the actual
conference was that a clause be inserted in the article defining the
shelf, and stipulating that no state could exploit the seabed and
subsoil off the coast of another without its express consent. 49 With
this sole addition, the conference accepted the recommendation of
the Commission, which was a compromise on the lowest common
denominator - words rather than substantive issues.
The problem which now confronts us is that it has become
technologically possible to drill for oil and other minerals far beyond
the 200-meter isobath, leaving the limit on the shelf rather openended. In addition, mineral exploitation has significant impacts on
other uses of the ocean -

fishing, navigation, and security -

and

these conflicting uses must be reconciled. I will return to current
attempts to deal with expanding national jurisdiction over the oceans
after I survey some of the more important technological innovations
in ocean exploitation.
IV.

RECENT INNOVATIONS

IN MARINE TECHNOLOGY AND

THEIR IMPACTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL USE OF THE OCEANS

In this section a number of innovations will be cataloged, current
and predicted, which were pinpointed at the first Mershon Conference on Law, Organization, and Security in the Use of the Oceans."
These innovations will be put into the following categories: fishing,
drilling and mining, military uses, and weather prediction and
control. 1 Although these have to be separated for purposes of
analysis, I do not wish to leave the reader with the misleading
4U.N. SEA CONFERENCE, 4th Committee, A/CONF. 13/42, at 43 (1957).
o Held at Columbus, Ohio, Ohio State University, March 17-18, 1967.
51 For other summaries, see, Abel & Sullivan, Trends in Marine Sciences, in ALEXANDER
(1967), at 42; W. BURKE, OCEAN SCIENCEs, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FUTURE
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA (1966); Burke, Law and the New Technologies,
in ALEXANDER (1967), at 204; MacDonald, What's in the Ocean, 64 INT'L SCI. &
TECH. 38 (1967); J. Craven, Technology and the Law of the Sea, Mar. 17, 1967
(unpublished paper presented to the first Mershon Conference on Law, Organization,
and Security in the Use of the Oceans, Mar. 17-18, 1967, at Ohio State University,
Columbus, Ohio) [hereinafter cited as 1st Mershon Conference]; J. Knauss, Problems in Oceanography1977, Mar. 17, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the
first Mershon Conference).
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impression that each category can actually be dealt with in isolation.
The ocean is a single system in which all technologies have multiple
impacts, compatible and incompatible, on other uses and users. Two
generalizations can be made which should be kept in mind at all
times but which are rarely underscored in the popular literature.
These are:
(a) That technological advance per se is inherently unlimited;
but
(b) That the widespread utilization of new technologies will
be determined, in broad terms, by the rate of return for
industry and by cost/benefit ratios for governments.
A. Innovationsin Fishing52
One built-in uncertainty about this problem is that we do not
know what major technological breakthroughs are likely, but
Kasahara suggests that research ought to be channeled primarily
into two major fields. These are: "the utilization of marine animals
(including zooplankton) at lower trophic levels; and the possibility
of changing oceanographic conditions to increase primary productivity." 3 Similarly, it is fair to say that, apart from normal improvements in gear, boats, the composition and capability of fleets, etc.,
most recent innovations reflect to varying degrees the concern with
moving from fishing as hunting to more efficient and controlled
systems of husbandry. 4
More specifically, these innovations have been directed toward
such activities as farming both crustacea and pelagic species in bays,
estuaries, and other enclosed places, herding fish in the open sea
by using electric fields or trained porpoises, harvesting krill in the
antarctic, manipulating the ecosystem of certain portions of the
ocean to increase productivity by inducing artificial upwelling, and
developing marine protein concentrate for human consumption. 5
Until these become effective methods of "aquaculture," Gemini
photographs have shown that it is possible to use orbiting satellites
This section is based primarily on the following unpublished works from the 1st
Mershon Conference: W. Chapman, Food Production from the Sea and the Nutritional
Requirements of the World; H. Kasahara, Food Production from the Ocean; D.
Moore, Developing Fishing Technology and the Future Law of the Sea; M. Schaefer,
Some Comments on Interaction between the Exploitation of the Food Resources and
Other Uses of the Ocean.
53H. Kasahara, supra note 52, at 17.
54Proceedings of the 1st Mershon Conference, at A6-A7 (privately distributed publication) ; see also, Isaacs, Food From the Sea, 64 INT'L Sci. & TECH. 61 (1967).
55 See, E. Miles, Some Socio-Cultural Problems Involved in Expanding Use of Marine
Protein Concentrate for Human Consumption, Oct. 5, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the Second Mershon Conference on Law, Organization, and Security in the
Use of the Oceans, Oct. 5-7, 1967, at Ohio State University, Columbus, Ohio)
[hereinafter cited as 2nd Mershon Conference].
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to detect large schools of fish and thereby to aid fishermen in their
search. 6
It has been suggested that sedentary fish farming and the
harvesting of pelagic species on the continental shelf have been
greatly facilitated by another major technological innovation saturation diving."7 But so far fish farming on a large scale is an
enormously expensive activity and is therefore not likely to be widely
employed. The difficulties of farming in the open ocean are still
considerable, and it is not at all clear that the harvesting of zooplankton will in the long run generate sufficient pay-off. The most
promising of the innovations cataloged here is thought to be inducing
artificial upwelling by nuclear energy, and it is estimated that the
cost/benefit ratios will become more favorable as the cost of producing nuclear energy decreases.5 8
B. Innovations in Drillingand Mining
I will not detail here specific innovations in ocean drilling and
mining activities. "9 I need only point out that the thrust of all these
innovations is to provide the petroleum and mining industries with
a greater mobility and an enlarged capability for operating at greater
depths of the ocean in their search for new raw materials and new
energy reserves. As one expert put it: "I believe that in the future,
semisubmersibles and the self-powered floaters will be committed
to ever-increasing water depths. The ultimate design objective for
a drilling unit is depicted as a totally automatic, submarine unit,
whose principal function will be unaffected by environmental
forces." 60
We should realize, also, that these developments will have
several side-effects among which will be an increase in the difficulty
of controlling oil and other pollution of the ocean. The emergence
of the supertanker has presented us with this problem in a magnitude
56 See, W. Chapman, Implications of Space Research to Fishery Development, Apr. 7,
1967 (Unpublished paper presented to the Symposium on the Ocean from Space
conducted by the American Society for Oceanography in Houston, Texas, Apr. 7,
1967).
57See, J. Craven, supra note 51, at 24-25; Clarke, Flechsig & Grigg, Ecological Studies
During Sealab 11, 157 SCIENCE 1381 (1967).
58 Comment by Dr. M. B. Schaefer at the 1st Mershon Conference.
59See Brooks, Deep Sea Manganese Nodules: From Scientific Phenomenon to World
Resources in THE FUTURE OF THE SEAS RESOURCES 32 (L. Alexander ed. 1968).

Hibbard, Offshore Petroleum and Natural Gas: A Marine Resource of Increasing
Importance in THE FUTURE OF THE SEAS RESOURCES 52 (L. Alexander ed. 1968) ;

Mero, Alternatives for Minteral Exploitation in id. at 94; Walthier, Remarks on the
Mining of Deep Ocean Mineral Deposits in id. at 98; Andel, Deep-Sea Drilling for
Scientific Purposes: A Decade of Dreams, 160 SCIENCE 1419 (1968); Coene, Profile

of Marine Resources, Mar. 17, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the 1st Mershon
Conference).
00 Hibbard, supra note 59, at 53.
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hitherto unexperienced. 61 Oil, as well as radioactive waste, will
continue to pollute the oceans, while we are still largely ignorant
of the effect of these on the ecosystem of the ocean.
C. Innovations in Military Technology
In the area of military technology we will continue to see
improvements on Polaris-type systems, accelerating research to
enhance a nation's anti-submarine warfare capability, improvements
in propulsion, particularly with regard to making the fuel cell an
economic alternative to nuclear power, and we are now at the point
where the emplacement of missile silos on the ocean floor is technically feasible. But perhaps the most dramatic recent innovation
is the deep submersible with its attendant improvements in the
structure of hulls and command and control systems. As Dr. John
Craven, Director of the United States Navy's Deep Submergence
Systems Project, states: "[T~he projection of deep-ocean technology
is such that in the period beyond 1980 we may expect a sociallysignificant proliferation of non-military submersibles and equipment
of low-cost, capable of operating throughout the water column at/or
on the bottom and capable of exploiting the sea bed or the resources
62
of the sea bed.1"
It is clear that these deep submersibles will be used for a wide
range of military and nonmilitary purposes, from finding lost
H-bombs and submarines, to conducting ocean science research, to
carrying out exploration and exploitation of mineral and petroleum
resources. They will be owned not only by governments but by
private companies and individuals, and this will add a host of new
complications to the use of the deep ocean and the sea bed. As far
as the utility of these vessels for research is concerned, one expert
has made the following observation:
Without question the most valued feature of the submersible
is that the observer can visit the site and make direct records of his
observations. Examples of the work thus made possible are direct,
prolonged observation of the behavior of marine organisms and of
the fine variability in sediments; observation of sediment transport
and features of deeply submerged canyons; observation of near
bottom currents with dye; discovery of extensive terraces on the
continental shelf; correlation of the biota with the nature of the
bottom sediment; proof of the existence of life at the deepest
known spot in the ocean; exploration of the bathymetry and biota
61 See Nanda, The "Torrey Canyon" Disaster: Some Legal Aspects, 44 DENvER L. J.
400 (1967); Walsh, Pollution: The Wake of the "Torrey Canyon," 160 SCIENCE
167 (1968).
62J. Craven, supra note 51; see also Craven, Ocean Technology and Submarine Warfare,
46 ADELPHI PAPERS 38-46 (1968); Craven, Working in the Sea, 64 INT'L SCI. &
TECH. 50

(1967).
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of Lake Michigan, revealing the existence
of a mid-lake sill, glacial
boulders, and snowlike precipitation. 63
D. Innovations in Weather Forecastingand Modification
Technological innovations which affect weather research include
the utilization of orbiting weather satellites (TIROS, ESSA,
HIMBUS) and improvements in buoy and other sensor technology
for data gathering purposes. The net result, therefore, is to permit
a potentially global observation which was heretofore impossible.64
Apart from this development, perhaps the greatest concern is being
focused on patterns of ocean circulation and their relationship with
the exchange of heat between the atmosphere and the oceans. 6"
It appears that it is this relationship which is crucial for understanding and predicting weather patterns - and particularly for understanding the generation of large-scale weather disturbances like
hurricanes and typhoons. 6
The need for more knowledge in this area is necessary not only
for improving forecasts, but it is also crucial to attempts to modify
the weather in different ways; the most dramatic example of which
may be the plans to seed hurricanes. The great problem here, however, relates to the uncertainty of the behavior of the hurricane after
it is seeded and the probable damage to countries in its path with
the possible subsequent liability of the country sponsoring the
research. There is agreement among scientists that the experiments
67
which are conducted should not lead to irreversible results.
V.

THE IMPACTS OF RECENT TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS

ON THE LAW OF THE SEA

It is clear that the thrust of all trends and technological innovations discussed above has been to extend the jurisdiction of the
coastal state beyond traditional limits and to stimulate increasing
national claims for even greater exclusive controls. Some agreement

has been made that this will facilitate the efficient exploitation of
oil and gas and minerals given the need of these industries for long
term security and predictability in their activities - a result of the
magnitude of the investment required. But if one looks at the
problem from a global perspective that includes other uses and users,
63Arnold, Manned Submersibles for Research, 158 SCIENCE 84-95 (1967).
64 See THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON MARINE RESOURCES AND ENGINEERING DEVELOPMENT,
65

UNITED

STATES ACTIVITIES IN SPACECRAFT OCEANOGRAPHY,

Oct.

1,

1967

(pamphlet).
NAS/NRC, INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ATMOSPHERE AND THE OCEANS 1-4 (pub.

No. 983, 1962).
66Miller, Characteristics of Hurricanes, 157 SCIENCE 1389-99 (1967).
67 See the comments by Dr. Athelstan Spilhaus, at the 1st Mershon Conference, Vol. II,
at D15-D19 (Mar. 17-18, 1967).
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the attractiveness of this alternative declines." s States with major
naval capabilities are not likely to find such carving up of the oceans
very desirable.
Furthermore, the scientific research requirements of ocean
exploration are such that only a coordinated, massive international
effort will yield comprehensive results. It is for this reason that
President Johnson's proposal for an international decade of ocean
exploration was favorably received by the Soviet Union and other
countries. "9
Thus, recent technological innovations have succeeded in bringing questions of ocean policy to the forefront of current international
political issues. These questions revolve mainly around the limits of
the continental shelf and jurisdiction over the floor beyond the shelf.
In other words, the major issues are who gets what, when, where,
and how, and the conflicts generated thereby impinge upon the
efficiency and feasibility of an international regulation system for
fisheries, oil and gas, minerals, transportation and navigation, and
security and recreation.7 0
Most recommendations which have been made fall into the four
categories, succinctly characterized by Richard Young:
(1) An extension of the shelf doctrine to all ocean areas,
thereby effecting a division of the ocean floor among coastal states
fronting on the ocean.
(2) A revision of the occupation theory which would permit
acquisitions by individual states, but which would establish by
multilateral convention an international registration system for
national claims, possibly along with some international controls and
some provision for preventing or resolving conflicts.
(3)
A vesting of the deep-sea floor in some international
agency, which would in effect act like a landlord in granting
68 For excellent summaries of the major questions involved, see Christy and Brooks,

Shared Resources of the World Community, in NEW DIMENSIONS FOR THE UNITED
NATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT DECADE (C. Eichelberger ed. 1966) ; Young,
The Legal Regime of the Deep-Sea Floor, 62 AM. J. INT'L L. 641-53 (1968) ; see
also Hearings on Governing the Use of Ocean Space Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
6
9N.Y. Times, June 18, 1968, at 23, col. 1.
70 Full discussions of these questions may be found in: Christy, The Distribution of
the Seas' Wealth in Fisheries, in THE LAW OF THE SEA, ALEXANDER (1967), at
106-21; F. CHISTY & A. SCoTT, THE COMMON WEALTH IN OCEAN FISHERIES
(1965); SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE ON OCEANIC RESEARCH OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC UNIONS, INTERNATIONAL OCEAN AFFAIRS: A SPECIAL

REPORT (1967) ; THE FUTURE OF THE SEA'S RESOURCES (L. Alexander ed., 1968) ;
Christy, Economic Criteria for Rules Governing Exploitation of Deep Sea Minerals,
2 INT'L LAWYER 224-42 (1968); W. Chapman, Problems of North Pacific and
Atlantic Fisheries, May 10, 1967 (unpublished paper presented at the Annual Meeting, Fisheries Council of Canada, Montreal, Canada); D. Cheever, The Role of
International Organizations in Ocean Development, Oct. 5, 1967 (unpublished paper
presented to the 2d Mershon Conference) ; F. Christy, Realities of Ocean Resources,
July 27, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the Marine Frontiers Conference,
University of Rhode Island, July 27-28, 1967); F. Christy, Alternative Regimes for
the Minerals of the Sea Floor, June 8, 1967 (unpublished paper presented to the
American Bar Association, National Institute on Marine Resources).
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licenses, leases, or concessions to explore and exploit the mineral

resources in specified areas.
(4) A vesting of the deep-sea floor in an international agency
which would itself carry on exploration and exploitation activities. 71

We should realize, however, that whatever resolutions are
finally decided upon will have to accommodate the national security
interests of all participants, particularly those with wide-ranging
naval capabilities. It is clear that the United States Navy would
prefer to place rather restrictive limits on the extent of exclusive
national jurisdiction in the ocean,7 and it is reasonable to assume
that in the near future the Soviet Union may also adopt this position
given the recent substantive inputs into the Soviet naval program
and their increasing activity in the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian
Ocean. Proposals, therefore, which look to the Antarctica and Outer
Space arrangements as models for the ocean do not take sufficient
account of the much different role of the oceans as a strategic
military arena when compared with the other two.
As in the field of space exploration, 8 the smaller nations,
especially the newly independent ones, have had and will continue
to have a considerable role in reshaping the law of the sea. The fact
that many of these are also coastal states gives further impetus to the
current trend of the extension of national jurisdiction over the ocean.
Therefore, future conflict over the exploitation of coastal fisheries,
the continental shelf, and the deep ocean floor may be greater
between those states on opposite sides of the capability dimension.
It may be, too, that as the fruits of exploitation grow, the less capable
will perceive the stakes as being so high that the incentive to go to
war over alleged intrusions may be greater unless some apparatus
exists which attempts to maximize the distribution of values for all
participants. However, the recent United Nations efforts to regulate
activities in the use of ocean space show promise toward establishing
an international mechanism to encourage peaceful uses in this fertile
74
area.
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Young, supra note 68, at 647-48.

7 See Michael, Avoiding the Militarization of the Sea in NEW

DIMENSIONS

FOR THE

UNITED NATIONS: THE PROBLEMS OF THE NEXT DECADE, at 167 (C. Eichelberger

ed., 1966); K. Frosch, Military Uses of the Ocean, 9 Oct. 5, 1967 (unpublished
paper presented to the 2d Mershon Conference); L. Zeni, Defense Needs in
Accomodations Among Ocean Users (unpublished paper presented to the Third
Annual Law of the Sea Institute, 1968).
73See E. Miles, Development of Legal Regimes to Guide Space Exploration, Aug. 28,
1968 (unpublished paper presented to the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics Conference on the Impact of Aerospace, Science and Technology on Law
and Government, Washington, D.C., Aug. 28-30, 1968).
74 For recent discussions, see Nanda, Peaceful Uses of Ocean Space, 9 VA. J. INT'L L.
000 (1969) ; Panel, Whose Is the Bed of the Sea, 62 PRoc. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 214
(1968).

